Michael A. Ledeen reflects on the legacy of President Carter’s Iran policy, the 1981 hostage agreement, and the question of American support for democratic movements inside Iran.

Jimmy Carter, the pacific man of the moment, may soon find a difficult period of his presidency under scrutiny. The Bush administration's national security team has been embroiled in a heated debate over Iran policy, and it revolves around a promise Mr. Carter made to Ayatollah Khomeini.

The policy issue is immense: to what extent can and should the United States support the rebellion of Iranians against the theocracy in power in Tehran?

A Debate Inside Washington

The president rejected the State Department's long-standing efforts to work with self-proclaimed “reformists” in Tehran and their failed leader, President Mohammad Khatami.

Mr. Bush was correct, Ledeen argued, that the United States should actively help the brave Iranians leading demonstrations against the regime, which he described as the world's major sponsor of terrorism.

A new generation had come of age in Iran, with two-thirds of the population under the age of twenty-five. According to Ledeen, many young Iranians despised the ruling clerics and admired America.

The Legacy of the 1981 Agreement

Opponents of a more vigorous Iran policy, notably Colin Powell and Richard Armitage, invoked a clause in Mr. Carter's 1981 agreement that produced the release of the American hostages shortly before Ronald Reagan was inaugurated.

The agreement stated that it would be the policy of the United States not to intervene, directly or indirectly, politically or militarily, in Iran's internal affairs.

Ledeen argued that the agreement was a “sole executive agreement” and could be abandoned whenever the president wished. Since Congress had no role in approving it, no congressional action would be required to undo it.

The 1981 hostage agreement remained a point of debate in later U.S. policy toward Iran.

Support for Democratic Movements

Ledeen argued that the United States had provided support to freedom movements in Central and Eastern Europe during the Cold War, in Yugoslavia against Slobodan Milošević, and in the Philippines against Ferdinand Marcos.

He questioned why similar support had not been offered to Iranians seeking freedom from the Islamic Republic.

While Washington hesitated, he argued, Iran-sponsored terrorists assassinated Americans, and Tehran actively interfered in American affairs by funding advocates of better relations between the two countries.

Historical Reassessment of Iran Policy

For Ledeen, the continued deference to Carter’s 1981 agreement represented a triumph of legalism over common sense.

He linked this legacy to Carter’s earlier view of Khomeini’s 1979 revolution, which Carter initially regarded as an improvement over the Shah before the hostage crisis ended his political career.

Ledeen concluded that such an approach was not worthy of an administration engaged in a global war on terrorism.

Conclusion

The article presents a forceful argument for abandoning outdated restrictions on American policy toward Iran and for supporting those seeking political change inside the country.

It also reflects a broader historical reassessment of U.S. policy from the fall of the Shah through the early years of the twenty-first century.